Saved passwords and autofill data
Pages cannot read passwords or addresses saved in the browser.
Password managers fill on user action or after an autofill choice. Known weak spot: hidden-field autofill attacks and the :autofill CSS pseudo-class, which reveals that a field was autofilled (a boolean), but never the value before user action.
What it can and can't do
What the user does: You tap a field and choose a saved login or address to fill
It can
- Tell that a field was filled, using the autofill style check
- Receive the value you choose to fill in
- Ask the browser to offer a saved login
It cannot
- See saved passwords
- See saved addresses or cards before you choose
- Get hidden fields filled before you choose, in most browsers
- See which entries exist in your password manager
Browser support
How a site asks for it
| API | none |
| How access is granted | not-exposed |
| What the user sees | None |
| Needs a secure context (HTTPS) | No |
| Needs a user gesture | No |
| How long it lasts | read fresh on every page load; nothing stored |
| How to take it back | not applicable |
| Inside an iframe | Readable from cross-origin iframes too (same values) |
Typical flow
- Page script reads the value
- No prompt is shown
Data you get
Shape: none
How often: static per session
| Field | Type | Unit | Range | Precision |
|---|---|---|---|---|
proxy: :autofill pseudo-class | string | None | styling hook shows a field was autofilled | Not listed |
proxy: Credential Management get() | string | None | mediated by a prompt for stored credentials of that origin only | Not listed |
Technical limits
- Credential theft
The story
What it is
Pages cannot read passwords or addresses saved in your browser.
For you
A site cannot ask your browser for a list of your saved passwords. Your browser fills in a login only when you tap or confirm. A site just sees the filled field after that.
For makers
Passwords and addresses are the most valuable data. Browsers fill only after a user action. There are some tricks, like hidden form fields that catch autofill, which vendors keep closing.
Where you see it
| Type | Example | Apps |
|---|---|---|
| banking | A bank login page shows your saved login only when you tap the field and confirm. | None named |
| shopping | A checkout page shows saved addresses after you pick one from the browser prompt. | None named |
| security | A malicious page used hidden form fields to catch autofill data, which browsers now block. | None named |
| social | A social site wanted all saved passwords to catch reuse and cannot. | None named |
| payments | A payment form shows a saved card after you approve it. | Stripe |
| developer | A developer builds login forms that work well with autofill. | None named |
| enterprise | A company portal wanted to see which sites use weak passwords and cannot. | None named |
Risks
- Hidden form autofill tricks
- Autofill after you tap shows data to the page
What the platform says
- Google: Chrome Password Manager. Google describes saving, filling and checking passwords in Chrome so you do not have to remember them.
Good uses and abuse
Legitimate uses
- None: the browser deliberately withholds it
Known abuse
- Hidden autofill harvesting phishing
Scores
| Score | Value | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| Sensitivity | 5 of 5 | How revealing the data is |
| Utility | 2 of 5 | How useful it is to honest apps |
| Friction | 3 of 5 | How much the user has to do |
| Fingerprint bits | 0 | Rough identifying entropy, when known |
Sources
How well checked: Based on official documentation.